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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

China-Nepal: Chou En-lai's recent replies to Nepal's protests over Chinese border activities are designed to mollify Katmandu and smooth the way for joint border commission talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Although Chou again denied any violation of Nepal's borders, Nepali officials said he offered "profuse apologies" for the "confessions" which captured Nepalis had been forced to sign and stated that Chinese troops had been withdrawn from the demilitarized zone on 25 July. Nepal's prime minister has welcomed the conciliatory Chinese actions, although he still contends that the clash in the Mustang area in late June took place in Nepali territory. (Page 2)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Republic of the Congo: Strong Belgian reaction to Hammarskjold's announcement of the imminent entry of UN troops into Katanga may stiffen Tshombé's opposition to this move and

force a delay in UN plans. This would further complicate the position of Dr. Bunche in negotiations with Tshombé, although Tshombé is unlikely to maintain his stand for full independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche is scheduled to arrive in Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshombé has previously indicated his willingness to reconsider his secession from the Congo, provided the Congo is made a federation with each province retaining a large measure of autonomy. Brussels probably hopes that Tshombé can rejoin the Congo on these terms; Belgian officials, however, have indicated that they are unwilling to risk censure in the Security Council by retaining troops throughout Katanga. The anticipated regrouping of Belgian troops at the Kamina base in Katanga will fall short of satisfying Lumumba's demand for total evacuation of all Belgian armed forces. [REDACTED] (Page 3)

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Lebanon: Saib Salam's 18-man cabinet, the largest in Lebanese history, formed on 2 August represents nearly every hue of the Lebanese political spectrum, including several pro-Nasir extremists. If the wide disparity of views represented in the cabinet inhibits effective operation of the government, a drift toward military control could result. While President Shihab's recent one-day "resignation" appears to have increased his prestige and influence, the new cabinet will be a test of his continued control. [REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic: The resignation of President Hector Trujillo, brother of the dictator, and the elevation to the presidency of Vice President Balaguer seems another step in the

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dictator's efforts to create a more favorable atmosphere prior to the 16 August meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS to hear Venezuelan charges against the Dominican Republic. However, only the removal of the dictator, his family, and close cohorts is likely to mollify the hatred of the Trujillo dictatorship inside the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere.

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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

With respect to the question of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions to initiate hostilities, the Watch Committee conclusions remain negative.

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Peiping Conciliatory Toward Nepal's Protests

Premier Chou En-lai has answered Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's protest of 11 July over Chinese border activities with three separate communications designed to mollify Katmandu and smooth the way for the joint border commission talks scheduled to begin on 8 August. Anti-Chinese sentiment in Nepal has not subsided, and Peiping appears eager to deny India the opportunity to point to incidents along the Sino-Nepali border as proof of China's aggressiveness.

Chou again denied that Chinese troops had entered Nepal and said that Koirala was "misinformed" over reports of recent incursions of Chinese on photographic and survey missions. Nepali officials said Chou did offer "profuse apologies" for the action of Chinese troops in extracting "confessions" from ten Nepali villagers captured at the time of the 27 June incident in the Mustang area, however, and stated that troops had been entirely withdrawn from the demilitarized zone.

As an additional conciliatory gesture, the first Chinese ambassador resident in Katmandu arrived on 2 August.

Koirala has welcomed Peiping's conciliatory moves, although he continues to contend that the recent incident took place on the Nepalese side of the border. In reply to critics in parliament who urged a tougher policy toward China, Koirala has cited Peiping's apology, its prompt payment of compensation, and its withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone, as well as the pending border commission meetings, as more important than the precise determination of the locale of the Mustang incident. [REDACTED]

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Tshombé Opposes Projected UN Occupation of Katanga

Strong Belgian reaction to Hammarskjold's announcement of the imminent entry of UN troops into Katanga may stiffen Tshombé's opposition to this move and force a delay in UN plans. This would further complicate the position of Dr. Bunche in negotiations with Tshombé, although Tshombé is unlikely to maintain his stand for full independence for Katanga. Dr. Bunche is scheduled to go to Elisabethville on 5 August. Tshombé, who probably has no more than 500 trained non-Belgian troops at his command, has previously indicated his willingness to re-join the Congo if it is reorganized as a confederation with a high degree of provincial autonomy.

Brussels' stated willingness to withdraw its forces in Katanga to its main base there, and to cooperate with the UN occupation of Katanga, appears to be in part a response to Western pressure. It will seriously impair the position of Tshombé, who is confronted with internal pressures for the maintenance of order and for reunification with the Lumumba government. Tshombé's parliamentary opposition has denounced his secession from the Congo and dissociated itself from assembly activities. At the same time, Belgian financial interests in Katanga are already hard hit by a decline of confidence in the Congo franc and by a 70- to 80-percent decline in business activity and are unlikely to encourage Tshombé in any unpromising military ventures.

Belgian officials reportedly accept "in principle" the need for a total military withdrawal from the Congo. Brussels appears to be moving toward such an evacuation, although the Belgians may attempt to negotiate with the Lumumba government for the retention of one or more of Belgium's three Congo bases to which they have withdrawn their forces. The Belgian cabinet is particularly sensitive to Belgian public opinion concerning any appeasement of the Lumumba government. The UN command in Leopoldville reportedly plans to send white contingents to Katanga in an effort to reassure the 15,000 Europeans still there. [REDACTED]

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Brother of Dominican Dictator Resigns From Presidency

The resignation of President Hector Trujillo--brother of the dictator Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo--and the elevation of Vice President Joaquin Balaguer to the presidency seems to be another effort to create a more favorable attitude toward the Dominican Government among western hemisphere nations before the OAS foreign ministers' meeting on 16 August. The regime has also released approximately fifty imprisoned dissidents and two leaders of the January plot against the regime, and has issued a last-minute invitation to an OAS Commission to visit the Dominican Republic to investigate Venezuela's charge that Trujillo sponsored the attempted assassination of President Betancourt on 24 June. The Generalissimo probably is convinced that the United States and most OAS member nations will recommend some form of multilateral action against the Dominican Government after their foreign ministers meet to consider Venezuela's charges that his dictatorship is guilty of aggression.

A government-controlled newspaper reported on 3 August that Generalissimo Trujillo has given up his office in the National Palace in favor of a private office elsewhere. However, only the complete removal from the scene of the dictator, his family, and close cohorts is likely to mollify the hatred of the Trujillo dictatorship inside the country as well as elsewhere in the hemisphere. The dissidents are known to associate Balaguer with atrocities carried out against enemies of the regime.

[redacted] 25X1
[redacted] the Generalissimo, envisioning sanctions and boycotts by the OAS, is planning a false and bloodless revolt by military officers loyal to him. A false revolt, however, [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] could easily result in genuine revolt. General "Ramfis" Trujillo--the dictator's son--reportedly left the Dominican Republic on 27 July to live in Switzerland. [redacted] 25X1

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Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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